State of Utah v. Patrick Dean Coando : Unknown by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1990
State of Utah v. Patrick Dean Coando : Unknown
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Dixon D. Hindley; Attorney for Appellant.
R. Paul Van Dam, Sandra Sjogren; Attorneys for Respondent.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, State v. Coando, No. 900019.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2832
* OFFICE OF KFU 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAI45.9 
.S9 
DOCKET NO, 
BRIER 
looofl 
MS 
%„ 18 9 e
 ### 
STATE OF UTAH 
R. PAUL VAN D A M - ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 STATE CAPITOL • SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114 • TELEPHONE: 801-538-1015 • FAX NO. 801-538-1121 
JOSEPH E. TESCH 
CHIEF DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
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JAN1 1310 
Ctork, Sujuwi* Court, Utah 
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Utah Supreme Court 
332 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Re: State v. Patrick P. Coando 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
fflM/f 
The respondent, State of Utah, hereby waives the right 
to file a Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
in the above-referenced case pursuant to Rule 47(d), Rules of the 
Utah Supreme Court. This waiver does not constitute a 
stipulation that the petition should be granted, but rather, it 
is respondent's position that the petition should be denied based 
upon the legal analysis contained in the Brief of Respondent and 
the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals which are attached to 
this letter. In the event that the Court deems an additional 
response by the State necessary to its determination, a Brief in 
Opposition will be provided. 
Thank you for your consideration. 
Very truly yours, 
SANDRA L. (^S^mEW 
Assistant Attorney General 
SLS:bks 
cc: Dixon Hindley 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v, 
Patrick Dean Coando, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
Case No. 880546-CA 
F I L E D 
DEC 1 51989 
_^__.,o(r* Court 
Eighth District, Duchesne County ohc#un + *rpm* 
The Honorable Dennis L. Draney 
Attorneys: Dixon D. Hindley, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and Sandra Sjogren, Salt Lake 
City, for Respondent 
Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Croft I1 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Defendant Patrick Dean Coando appeals his conviction of 
issuing bad checks, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (Supp. 1989). Defendant urges reversal of 
his conviction, claiming that the State lacks jurisdiction. We 
affirm. 
On October 26, 1987, defendant was charged in Roosevelt, 
Duchesne County, Utah, with the crime of issuing bad checks. The 
bad checks which defendant was .charged included a check for $165 
to Safeway, checks for $29.26 and $20 to Tri-Mart, checks for $50 
and $20 to Triangle Oil, and checks for $50 and $20 to Vernal 
Drug, for a total of $354.26. Safeway, Tri-Mart, and Triangle 
Oil are in Roosevelt. Vernal Drug and the Vernal branch of First 
Interstate Bank of Utah (First Interstate), the drawee of each 
bad check, are in Vernal, Uintah County. 
1. Bryant H. Croft, Senior District Judge, sitting by special 
appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10) (Supp. 
1989). 
Defendant pleaded guilty to the charges and entered into an 
abeyance agreement, which required him to make restitution 
payments and refrain from similar legal violations. On April 25, 
1988, the district court in Duchesne County, having found that 
defendant had violated the abeyance agreement, set aside the plea 
in abeyance and entered judgment on the guilty plea. Defendant 
moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction at an order to show 
cause hearing, on grounds that he was an enrolled tribal member 
of the Uintah and Wind River Reservations and that the offenses 
were committed on the Uintah-Ouray Reservations. The court 
denied defendant's motion, finding that he was not an enrolled 
member of the Uintah and Ouray Reservations and that all the 
checks issued by defendant were drawn on First Interstate Bank of 
Utah, Vernal branch, which is not within an Indian reservation. 
On appeal, defendant claims that the State lacks 
jurisdiction because he is an Indian and all but two of the bad 
checks were passed in Roosevelt, which is in Indian country and 
not subject to state jurisdiction. See Ute Indian Tribe v. State 
of Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072, 1188 (D. Utah 1981), aff'd in part, 
rev'd in part, 716 F.2d 1298 (10th Cir. 1983), reh'g 773 F.2d 
1087 (10th Cir. 1985), cert, denied, 107 S. Ct. 596 (1986). 
Defendant concedes that the State has jurisdiction to prosecute 
for the two checks totaling $70 written to Vernal Drug, in Uintah 
County. He contends, as a result, that the State may charge him 
with a class B misdemeanor only, and not a third degree felony 
because the amount involved is less than $200. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-505(3)(a) (Supp. 1989). 
The State argues that notwithstanding the Ute Indian Tribe 
decision, Roosevelt is not in Indian country and further, that 
defendant did not sufficiently establish his membership in an 
Indian tribe. In addition, the State argues that payment by the 
drawee bank is an essential element of the bad check offense thus 
giving the State jurisdiction over all offenses involving checks 
drawn on banks located within the state and undisputedly not 
within Indian country. We address this second argument first, 
and find it dispositive. 
ESSENTIAL ELEMENT 
The State argues that First Interstate's refusing payment of 
the checks defendant issued is an essential element of the bad 
check offense and because the refusal occurred outside Indian 
country, the State may assert proper jurisdiction over all the 
bad check charges arising from checks drawn on First Interstate. 
We agree. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201 (1978) states in pertinent 
part: 
(1) A person is subject to prosecution 
in this state for an offense which he 
commits, while either within or outside 
the state, by his own conduct or that of 
another for which he is legally 
accountable, if: 
(a) the offense is committed either 
wholly or partly within the state; 
(2) An offense is committed partly 
within this state if either the conduct 
which is an element of the offense, or the 
result which is such an element, occurs 
within this state. 
Under section 76-1-201, if conduct or a result of conduct 
constituting any element of the offense occurs within the state, 
the State has jurisdiction to prosecute the offense. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(1) (Supp. 1989) defines the 
elements of the crime of issuing a bad check or draft as follows: 
Any person who issues or passes a check 
or draft for the payment of money, for the 
purpose of obtaining from any person, 
firm, partnership, or corporation, any 
money, property, or other thing of value 
or paying for any services, wages, salary, 
labor, or rent, knowing it will not be 
paid by the drawee and payment is refused 
bv the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad 
check or draft. 
(Emphasis added.)2 
2. Prior to enactment of section 76-6-505 in 1973, passing 
checks without sufficient funds was governed by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-20-11 (1953). Under section 76-20-11, refusal of payment 
was not an element of the crime, but instead served only as 
admissible proof of presentment and presumptive evidence of 
insufficiency of funds. 
When construing statutory language, we assume that all words 
and terms are used advisedly and interpret terms in accordance 
with their commonly accepted meaning. Pate v. Marathon Stegl 
QQ_U, 111 P.2d 428. 430 (Utah 1989); Hector Inc. v. United Sav^_& 
Loan Ass'n, 741 P.2d 542. 546 (Utah 1987); Grant v. Utah State 
Land Bd.. 26 Utah 2d 100. 485 P.2d 1035. 1036 (1971); Gleave v. 
Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 749 P.2d 660. 672 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). The language of section 76-6-505 unambiguously provides 
that the drawee's refusal to pay is an essential element of the 
offense since the provision is written in the conjunctive and 
requires refusal of payment for the offense to be complete. The 
Colorado Supreme Court considered similar language in Colorado's 
former bad check statute and found that refusal to pay was an 
element of the crime. People v. Ouinn, 190 Colo. 534. 549 P.2d 
1332, 1334-35 (Colo. 1976) (en banc).3 See also State v. 
Green, 672 P.2d 400. 403 (Utah 1983) (Hall. C.J.. dissenting) 
(the essential elements of the bad check offense include refusal 
of payment by the drawee). If the drawee bank does not refuse to 
pay. the crime has not been committed. See Riogs v. State, 34 
Md. App. 324. 367 A.2d 22. 26 (1976) (relying on the principle 
that every element of a crime must be proved, the court reversed 
judgment where the State did not establish that the statutorily 
required element that the same check which defendant used to 
obtain money be dishonored upon presentment). 
Defendant argues that refusal by the drawee to pay is merely 
a condition confirming that the offender had the requisite 
culpable intent4 or knovrledge when he issued the check and not 
an essential element of the crime. Defendant claims that the 
3. In Ouinn and in People v. Vinnola, 177 Colo. 405. 494 P.2d 
826. 831 (Colo. 1972) (en banc), the Colorado court found that 
the provision of Colorado's bad check statute which required 
dishonor by the drawee bank violated constitutional due process 
and equal protection of the laws because it allowed a third 
party complete discretion to determine criminal liability by 
either paying or dishonoring checks. Defendant has not 
challenged the constitutionality of the Utah statute either at 
trial or on appeal. We. therefore, will not address the issue 
sua sponte. See 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 92 (1984); cf. 
State in Re N.H.B., 777 P.2d 487 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (a court 
will consider a constitutional issue raised for the first time 
on appeal if a liberty interest is at stake). 
4. Intent to defraud is not a necessary element of the bad 
check offense under section 76-5-505 as now written. State v. 
Delmotte, 665 P.2d 1314. 1315 (Utah 1983). 
statute is a codification of common law fraud and, consequently, 
since the corpus delicti of the offense is the conduct of passing 
the check for value with the intent to defraud, the essential 
elements of the crime are restricted to the mens rea and actus 
reus of the perpetrator. We note, however, that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-1-105 (1978) provides that "Common law crimes are abolished 
and no conduct is a crime unless made so by this code, other 
applicable statute or ordinance." In essence, defendant asks the 
court to limit the dishonor requirement to a statutorily 
established presumption or prima facie case. Some jurisdictions 
have done so, but their statutory language is clearly different 
than Utah's. See e.g., Tolbert v. State, 294 Ala. 738, 321 So.2d 
227, 230-31 (Ala. 1975); State v. Haremza. 515 P.2d 1217, 1224 
(Kan. 1973). Further, defendant offers no support for his 
contention that the essential elements of the offense are limited 
to the mens rea or actus reus of the perpetrator or his assertion 
that the statute is merely a codification of common law fraud. 
In determining the essential elements of the bad check offense, 
we must follow section 76-6-505#s unambiguous language rather 
than the requisites of common law fraud. We, therefore, hold 
that because the drawee*s refusing payment is an essential 
element of the crime of issuing a bad check and that element 
occurred in this case within the state, the State had proper 
jurisdiction to prosecute defendant for all bad checks written on 
First Interstate. 
Our holding precludes the necessity of determining whether 
Roosevelt, Utah, is part of federally recognized Indian country, 
and whether defendant sufficiently established his membership in 
an Indian tribe. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
WE,CONCUR: 
Russe l l W. Bench, Jydge 
\ftknt H, Croft , Judge 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent. : Case Np. 880546-CA 
: 
vs. : 
: 
PATRICK DEAN COANDO, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a final order of the Eighth 
District Court, in and for Duchesne County, State of Utah, 
denying defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction 
made July 9, 1988, at defendant's sentencing hearing. This 
appeal was transferred by the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah 
Court of Appeals. This court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) and (h) (1971), 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the State's jurisdiction was proper in this 
matter because an essential element of each aspect of defendant's 
offense of issuing bad checks was committed on property within 
the State's jurisdiction? 
2. Whether defendant may properly be considered to be 
an Indian for purposes of federal criminal jurisdiction and 
whether Roosevelt, Utah may properly be considered to be part of 
federally recognized Indian Country? 
3. Whether defendant's crimes must be punished as a 
class B misdemeanor at the very minimum? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
18 D.S.C. S 1151 (1982): 
Except as otherwise provided in sections 
1154 and 1156 of this title, the term "Indian 
country," as used in this chapter, means (a) 
all land within the limits of any Indian 
reservation under the jurisdiction of the 
United States Government notwithstanding the 
issuance of any patent, and, including 
rights-of-way running through the 
reservation, (b) all dependent Indian 
communities within the boarders of the United 
States whether within the original or 
subsequently acquired territory thereof, and 
whether within or without the limits of a 
state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the 
Indian titles to which have not been 
extinguished, including rights-of-way running 
through the same. 
18 U.S.C. S 1152 (1982): 
Except as otherwise expressly provided by 
law, the general laws of the United States as 
to the punishment of offenses committed in 
any place within the sole and exclusive 
jurisdiction of the United States, except the 
District of Columbia, shall extend to the 
Indian country. 
This section shall not extend to offenses 
committed by one Indian against the person or 
property of another Indian, nor to any Indian 
committing any offense in the Indian country 
who; has been punished by the local law of 
the tribe, or to any case where, by treaty 
stipulations, the exclusive jurisdiction over 
such offenses is or may be secured to the 
Indian tribes respectively. 
18 D.S.C. § 1153 (1982): 
Any Indian who commits against the person 
or property of another Indian or other person 
any of the following offenses, namely, 
murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, rape, 
carnal knowledge of any female, not his wife, 
who has not attained the age of sixteen 
years, assault with intent to commit rape, 
incest, assault with intent to commit murder, 
assault with a dangerous weapon, assault 
resulting in serious bodily injury, arson, 
burglary, robbery, and larceny, within the 
Indian country, shall be subject to the same 
laws and penalties as all other persons 
committing any of the above offenses, within 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the United 
States. 
As used in this section, the offenses of 
burglary and incest shall be defined and 
punished in accordance with the laws of the 
State in which such offense was committed as 
are in force at the time of such offense. 
In addition to the offenses of burglary and 
incest, any other of the above offenses which 
are not defined and punished by Federal law 
in force within the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the United States shall be defined and 
punished in accordance with the laws of the 
State in which such offense was committed as 
are in force at the time of such offense. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-201 (1978): 
(1) A person is subject to prosecution in 
this state for an offense which he commits, 
while either within or outside the state, by 
his own conduct or that of another for which 
he is legally accountable, if: 
(a) The offense is committed either 
wholly or partly within the state; or 
(b) The conduct outside the state 
constitutes an attempt to commit an 
offense within the state; or 
(c) The conduct outside the state 
constitutes a conspiracy to commit an 
offense within the state and an act in 
furtherance of the conspiracy occurs in 
the state; or 
(d) The conduct within the state 
constitutes an attempt, solicitation, or 
conspiracy to commit in another 
jurisdiction an offense under the laws of 
both this state and such other 
jurisdiction. 
(2) An offense is committed partly within 
this state if either the conduct which is an 
element of the offense, or the result which 
is such an element, occurs within this state. 
In homicide the "result" is either the 
physical contact which causes death, or the 
death itself; and if the body of a homicide 
victim is found within the state, the death 
shall be presumed to have occurred within the 
state. 
(3) An offense which is based on an omission 
to perform a duty imposed by the law of this 
state is committed within the state 
regardless of the location of the offender at 
the time of the omission. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (1988) 
(1) Any person who issues or passes a 
check or draft for the payment of money, for 
the purpose of obtaining from any person, 
firm, partnership, or corporation, any money, 
property, or other thing of value or paying 
for any services, wages, salary, labor, or 
rent, knowing it will not be paid by the 
drawee and payment is refused by the drawee, 
is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft. 
For purposes of this subsection, a person 
who issues a check or draft for which payment 
is refused by the drawee is presumed to know 
the check or draft would not be paid if he 
had no account with the drawee at the time of 
issue. 
(2) Any person who issues or passes a 
check or draft for the payment of money, for 
the purpose of obtaining from any person, 
firm, partnership, corporation, any money, 
property, or other thing of value or paying 
for any services, wages, salary, labor, or 
rent, payment of which check or draft is 
legally refused by the drawee, is guilty of 
issuing a bad check or draft if he fails to 
make good and actual payment to the payee in 
the amount of the refused check or draft 
within 14 days of his receiving actual notice 
of the check or draft's nonpayment. 
(3) An offense of issuing a bad check or 
draft shall be punished as follows: 
(a) If the check or draft or series of 
checks or drafts made or drawn in this 
state within a period not exceeding six 
months amounts to a sum of not more than 
$200, such offense shall be a class B 
misdemeanor. 
(b) If the check or draft or checks or 
drafts made or drawn in this state within 
a period not exceeding six months amounts 
to a sum exceeding $200 but not more than 
$300, such offense shall be a class A 
misdemeanor. 
(c) If the check or draft or checks or 
drafts made or drawn in this state within 
a period not exceeding six months amounts 
to a sum exceeding $300 but not more than 
$1,000, such offense shall be a felony of 
the third degree. 
(d) If the check or draft or checks or 
drafts made or drawn in this state within 
a period not exceeding six months amounts 
to a sum exceeding $1,000, such offense 
shall be a second degree felony. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On October 26, 1987, defendant was charged with the 
crime of issuing bad checks, a third degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (1953, as amended) (R. 2). 
Defendant entered a guilty plea to the charge on November 23, 
1987, before the Eighth Judicial District Court, in and for 
Duchesne County, the Honorable Dennis L. Draney, presiding (R. 
98). Subsequent to the guilty plea, defendant entered into a 
plea in abeyance agreement (R. 99). On April 25, 1988, defendant 
was found to have violated the agreement and a judgement of 
guilty was entered (R. 60-61). At an order to show cause hearing 
held on July 19, 1988, defendant made a motion to dismiss for 
lack of jurisdiction, which motion was denied and sentence was 
imposed (R. 133-34, 150-51). Notice of appeal by defendant was 
filed on August 5, 1988 (R. 74). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
An amended information was filed by the Duchesne County 
Attorney in the Seventh Circuit Court of the State of Utah, 
Duchesne County, Roosevelt Department on October 26, 1987, which 
charged defendant with the crime of issuing bad checks, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (1953, 
as amended) (R. 2). The crimes were alleged to have been 
committed at Roosevelt, Duchesne County, Utah and Vernal, Uintah 
County, Utah (R. 2). Seven checks were written to the 
establishments of Safeway, Tri-Mart, Vernal Drug, and Triangle 
Oil, at a total amount of $354.26 (R. 2). Defendant pled guilty 
to these charges on November 23, 1987 and an abeyance agreement 
was entered into, under which defendant was to make restitution 
payments and to refrain from any other similar conduct or legal 
violations (R. 87, 98). 
On April 25, 1988, defendant was found to have violated 
the agreement for failure to make the required restitution 
payments and issuing additional bad checks (R. 60-61). 
Subsequently, the plea in abeyance was set aside and judgment was 
entered on the guilty plea (R. 61). 
On July 19, 1988, the Eighth Judicial District Court 
heard an order to show cause why the previously given probation 
should not be revoked and why the sentence previously suspended 
should not be imposed (R. 132). Defendant moved to dismiss for 
lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that defendant is a Uintah 
Indian and the offenses were committed on the Uintah-Ouray 
Reservation (R. 134-35). Defendant proffered only his own 
testimony in support of his assertions (R. 135). 
Defendant testified that although his permanent address 
was a post office box in Vernal, Utah, he resided wherever his 
job took him (R. 136). He also testified that he and five other 
Indians have a casing company called F.A.C.S. (R. 137). Further, 
defendant explained that his father is full-blooded Shoshoni 
Indian, his mother is enrolled in the Uintah Band, and defendant, 
himself, was one-fourth shoshoni and three-eighths Uintah Indian 
(R. 137). 
Upon cross-examination, defendant maintained that he 
was a Uintah Indian and that he possessed enrollment cards from 
the Uintah and Wind River (Shoshoni) Reservations (R. 140). 
However, no enrollment cards were produced, or admitted into 
evidence (R. 142, 43). On cross-examination defendant also 
admitted that Vernal Drug is located on State ground (R. 141). 
After hearing defendant's proffers, the Eighth Judicial 
District Court denied defendant's motion, finding that the 
evidence did not support defendant's claim that he is an enrolled 
member of the Ute Indian Tribe (R. 146). Additionally, the court 
noted that some of the bad checks were written on State land and 
all of the checks were drawn on a bank whicl> is not on the 
reservation (R. 146-47). Defendant was sentenced to the Utah 
State Prison for a term not to exceed five years (R. 151). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State's jurisdiction in this matter was proper 
regardless of defendant's assertion that he is an Indian for 
federal jurisdictional purposes and the offenses occurred in 
Indian Country. Essential elements of each bad check offense 
that of the drawee's refusal of payment, occurred at the First 
Interstate Bank of Vernal, which is located within the State's 
jurisdiction. Statutory law in Utah and case law in sister 
jurisdictions supports the State's assertion of jurisdiction in 
matters such as the instant case. Thus, this Court need not 
reach the issue of whether defendant is an Indian. 
Alternatively, defendant's proffered evidence failed to 
establish that he is recognized as an Indian for federal criminal 
jurisdiction purposes. His illogical testimony concerning his 
Indian blood heritage and failure to offer credible evidence 
concerning his recognition by the tribe as an Indian support the 
court's conclusion that defendant failed to meet his burden in 
establishing himself as an Indian. The State also reasserts that 
the City of Roosevelt, Utah is not part of the Uintah-Ouray 
Reservation based upon its arguments in the case of State v. 
Perank which are currently under advisement before the Utah 
Supreme Court. The State submits that this Court should at least 
refrain from a determination of the issue until the Supreme Court 
has ruled. 
Finally, if this Court accepts defendant's arguments 
and finds that the State's jurisdiction was improperly exercised 
in this case, the State submits that defendants' criminal acts 
must at least be punishable by the State as a class B 
misdemeanor. Defendant has pled guilty to issuing these bad 
checks, two of which, totalling $70.00 were passed on state land 
in every element of the offense. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STATE PROPERLY EXERCISED JURISDICTION 
REGARDLESS OF DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS THAT HE IS 
AN INDIAN AND THE ILLEGAL ACTS TOOK PLACE IN 
INDIAN COUNTRY. 
Defendant's claims that jurisdiction in this matter 
should properly be before the Ute Tribal Court or in an 
appropriate Federal Court is based on his assertions that he is 
an Indian and the crimes took place on an Indian Reservation. 
(See Br. of App. at 4.) However, whether defendant may legally 
be recognized as an Indian and whether certain localities such as 
Roosevelt, Utah are part of Indian Country need not be addressed 
by this Court. Jurisdiction is conferred by Utah Code Ann. §§ 
76-1-201 (1978) and 76-6-505 (1988). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201 (1978) directs: 
(1) A person is subject to prosecution in 
this state for an offense which he commits, 
while either within or outside the state, by 
his own conduct or that of another for which 
he is legally accountable, if: 
(a) The offense is committed 
either wholly or partly within the 
state; 
(2) An offense is committed partly within 
this state if either the conduct which is an 
element of the offense, or the result which 
is such an element, occurs within this state. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (1988) defines the elements of the 
crime of issuing a bad check or draft as follows: 
(1) Any person who issues or passes a 
check or draft for the payment of money, for 
the purpose of obtaining from any person, 
firm, partnership, or corporation, any money, 
property, or other thing of value or paying 
for any services, wages, salary, Jabor, or 
rent, knowing it will not be paid by the 
drawee and payment is refused by the drawee, 
is guilty of a issuing a bad check or draft. 
(Emphasis added.) Therefore, according to these statutes, the 
State may correctly claim jurisdiction over a charge of issuing 
bad checks if any of the elements of the crime, i.e. (1) passing 
the check; (2) knowing that the check will not be honored; and 
(3) refusal by the drawee to pay, have been committed within the 
State. 
Defendant's guilty plea, entered November 23, 1987, to 
the third degree felony of issuing bad checks in an amount 
exceeding $300 but less than $1,000 (Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
505(3)(c) (1988)) is based upon seven checks written to Safeway, 
Tri-Mart, Vernal Drug, and Triangle Oil (R. 2). Although some of 
these establishments are located in Roosevelt (which defendant 
argues is on the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservations) (see Brief 
of App. at 5-6), the First Interstate Bank of Vernal, drawee of 
each of these bad checks, is clearly within state jurisdiction 
because Vernal, Uintah County, Utah, is not part of Indian 
Country. Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 521 F.Supp. 1072, 
1188, aff'd in part, reversed in part, 716 F.2d 1298, on 
rehearing, 773 F.2d 1087, cert, denied, 107 S. Ct. 596 (1986). 
Therefore, although there may be elements of the crime that 
occurred on land arguably part of Indian Country, the element of 
the drawee refusing payment occurred on land that is definitely 
not in Indian country. Accordingly, § 76-1-201 directs that 
defendant is subject to prosecution within the State regardless 
of his assertions that he is an Indian and the checks passed to 
i n 
businesses in Roosevelt, Utah were located on land subject to 
federal jurisdiction. 
In the recent case of State v. Lane, 771 P.2d 1150 
(Wash. 1989), the Supreme Court of Washington considered whether 
the State of Washington had jurisdiction to try three defendants 
on charges of aggravated first degree murder when the victim was 
killed at Fort Lewis, Washington, land held under exclusive 
federal jurisdiction. 771 P.2d at 1151. The court concluded 
that the "State of Washington may exercise jurisdiction over a 
criminal offense if an essential element of the offense occurred 
within the state but outside the land ceded to the federal 
government (where the offense culminated)." Id. at 1152. 
Washington's statutory language mirrors the statutory language of 
Utah previously quoted. Specifically, RCW 9A.04.030(1) (1988) 
states that "[t]he following persons are liable for punishment: 
(1) A person who commits in the state any crime, in whole or in 
part." The court explained that an offense "is committed 'in 
part' in Washington, within the contemplation of the criminal 
jurisdiction statute, when an 'essential element' of the offense 
has been committed here." 771 P.2d at 1153-54; citing, State v. 
Moore, 189 Wash. 680, 690-92, 66 P.2d 836 (1937); State v. 
Swanson, 16 Wash.App. 179, 180, 554 P.2d 364 (1976), review 
denied, 88 Wash.2d 1014, cert, denied, 434 U.S. 967, (1977). 
In the Washington case, the State conceded that "the 
fatal wounds were inflicted, and the victim's death occurred, in 
this area of exclusive federal jurisdiction." 771 P.2d at 1153. 
However, the State asserted that the element of "premeditation" 
occurred within the State's jurisdiction, and that this element 
was an essential component of the charge. 2^ d. The Supreme Court 
of Washington agreed: 
premeditation is an element separate and 
distinct from the specific intent to kill 
required for first degree murder; it also 
distinguishes first degree murder from second 
degree murder. The failure of th€> state to 
sufficiently establish premeditation has been 
held to require reversal of a conviction for 
aggravated first degree murder. Clearly, 
therefore, premeditation constitutes an 
essential element of the crime of aggravated 
first degree murder. 
It follows from the foregoing, that if the 
State makes a sufficient showing to establish 
that premeditation occurred in this state 
outside Fort Lewis before the infliction of 
the fatal wounds at Fort Lewis, then the 
State of Washington has jurisdiction to try 
petitioners for the crime of aggravated first 
degree murder. 
771 P.2d at 1154-55. In the case at hand, the element of the 
crime of issuing bad checks that the drawee refused payment is 
essential because without the final step of refusal of payment by 
the drawee, the crime of issuing bad checks does not occur. If 
the bank actually made payment, or the establishment never 
tendered the check for payment, an essential element would be 
lacking and the defendant could not be found guilty of the 
offense. 
In the instant case, this essential element of the 
crime was completed. With the First Interstate Bank of Vernal's 
refusal of payment, defendant's offense reached fruition. The 
State's jurisdiction over defendant should be affirmed according 
to § 76-1-201 because this offense was committed "partly within 
the state." For this reason, it is irrelevant whether defendant 
is an Indian or whether some other elements of the crime occurred 
on the Reservation and this Court need not address either of 
these issues. 
POINT II 
THE STATE PROPERLY ASSERTED ITS JURISDICTION 
OVER DEPENDANT IN THAT THE CRIMES DID NOT 
OCCUR IN INDIAN COUNTRY AND DEFENDANT HAS NOT 
SATISFIED THE FEDERAL JURISDICTIONAL 
REQUIREMENTS OF PROVING HIMSELF AN INDIAN. 
As defendant points out in his brief, whether exclusive 
federal criminal jurisdiction exists depends upon two prongs (See 
Brief of App. at 5.) These prongs are whether the criminal acts 
occurred in "Indian Country" as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1151 
(1976) and whether defendant may be found to be "Indian" for 
purposes of jurisdiction under federal law. See United States v. 
Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1262-64 (9th Cir. 1979), cert, denied, 
444 U.S. 859 (1980). Defendant failed to establish either of 
these prongs, and, if this court reaches these issues, it may 
still find that jurisdiction was properly asserted by the State. 
A. Roosevelt, Utah Is Not Located In Indian Country. 
This issue has previously been extensively briefed and 
argued in the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Clinton Perank, Case 
No. 860196. The Court took Perank under advisement on October 
11, 1988. This Court may wish to refrain from ruling on this 
issue, should it become necessary to address the issue, until the 
Supreme Court has ruled. In any event, Appendix A contains the 
State's argument on this issue in the Perank case. The State 
reasserts the argument in this Court that Roosevelt is not in 
Indian country and incorporates Appendix A as its analysis of the 
issue. 
B. Defendant Failed To Make The Necessary Showing That 
He Is An Indian For Purposes of Exclusive Federal 
Criminal Jurisdiction. 
While 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152 and 1153 preclude state 
criminal jurisdiction over "Indians" who commit crimes on Indian 
reservations, defendant cannot avail himself of that defense 
because he did not meet his evidentiary burden to establish that 
he is an Indian. The testimony of defendant at the Order to Show 
Cause Hearing on July 19, 1988 concerning his status as an Indian 
consisted of the following: 
Q: (by Defense) And are you an Indian? 
A: Yes, I am 
Q: What is your affiliation? 
A: My father in [sic] one-half—my father in 
[sic] one full—he is four-fourths Shoshoni 
Indian off the Wind River Reservation, and 
I'm one-fourth Shoshoni off the Wind River 
Reservation. My mother is enrolled in the 
Uintah Band over here on the Ute--what they 
call the Ute Tribe Reservation, but she is in 
the Uintah Band, and so am I. I'm three-
eights Uintah Indian. 
Q: Does the tribe recognize you as a member? 
A: They do. 
(R. 137.) 
This testimony fails to offer any objective proof of 
defendant's recognition by any tribe, such as enrollment cards 
which were never produced or offered into evidence, or the 
testimony of any other tribal members or authorities. Further, 
defendant's testimony is internally inaccurate and is, therefore, 
incredible. Defendant testified that his father is full-blooded 
Shoshoni Indian, yet defendant states he is only one-fourth 
Shoshoni. He also states that he is three-eighths Uintah Indian. 
Presumably this would make defendant's mother three-quarters 
Uintah Indian and leave her one-quarter unknown to this court. 
If defendant's father is, in fact, full-blooded Shoshoni and his 
mother is three-quarters Uintah and one-quarter unknown, 
defendant should logically be one-half Shoshoni, three-eighths 
Uintah and one-eighth unknown. However, defendant's incredible 
assertions are that he is one-quarter Shoshoni, three-eighths 
Uintah, leaving another three-eighths unknown. By his 
description, his largest tribal claim by blood, the Shoshoni 
tribe, has become the smallest blood connection. 
Aside from these inaccuracies, defendant only asserted 
that "the tribe" recognized him as a member. He did not specify 
which tribe he was referring to. Surely, defendant cannot claim 
that because the Shoshoni tribe recognizes him, the Ute Tribe has 
jurisdiction over his actions on the Ute Reservation. When 
defendant was asked by the court if he had any further evidence 
or testimony to present, he simply reasserted his position that 
"the facts state for themselves [defendant] is a member of the 
Uintah Band, that the incidents alleged took place on the 
reservation, and that according to federal Indian law the court 
is without jurisdiction." (R. 143). He did not present a Wind 
River enrollment card even though he earlier stated that he had 
such a card with him. Nor did he present a Ute enrollment card. 
That evidence does not qualify defendant as an Indian 
for purposes of avoiding state jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 
1152 and 1153. As a preeminent authority on Indian law has 
stated: "Several important Indian statutes, such as the federal 
criminal jurisdiction statutes [citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152 and 
1153] . . . use the word "Indian" without further definition. . . 
[T]he courts have taken the position in this situation that 
the term 'Indian' means an individual who has Indian blood and 
who is regarded as an Indian by his or her tribe or Indian 
community." F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 24 (1982 
ed.) (footnotes omitted and emphasis added). Defendant's 
evidence leaves in doubt his status vis-a-vis the Tribe. 
"Tribal membership as determined by the Indian tribe or 
community itself is often an essential element. In fact, a 
person of complete Indian ancestry who has never had relations 
with any Indian tribe may be considered a non-Indian for some 
legal purposes." Ld. at 19 (footnote omitted). "Some people 
therefore can be an Indian for one purpose but not for another." 
Id. at 26. And Cohen specifies that one who is an "Indian" for 
some purposes may not necessarily qualify to avoid state criminal 
jurisdiction. Id. 
"[T]wo elements must be satisfied before it can be 
found that the appellant is an Indian under federal law. . . [He 
must have] a significant percentage of Indian blood . . . [and 
he] must be recognized as an Indian either by the federal 
government or by some tribe or society of Indians.M Goforth v. 
Oklahoma, 644 P.2d 114, 116 (Okla.Crim.App. 1982). In that case, 
"[t]he record [was] devoid . . • of any evidence tending to show 
that the appellant was recognized as an Indian. Absent such 
recognition, we cannot hold that [he] is an Indian under federal 
law . . . ." Id. Since the appellant was not an Indian under 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1152 and 1153, those statutes did not preempt state 
jurisdiction. Id. 
Having failed to establish the nature and extent of any 
relationship he may have with the tribe, defendant in this case 
also has not shown that he is an Indian. Utah's jurisdiction 
therefore was not preempted. CJ[. New Mexico v. Cutnose, 532 
P.2d 896, 898 (N.M. Ct.App. 1974) ("The jurisdictional challenge 
was to a court exercising general jurisdiction. . . . The burden 
was upon defendant to demonstrate a lack of jurisdiction in the 
district court.") Since he sought to invoke a special exception 
to the State's jurisdiction, he was the moving party and had the 
burden of producing prima facie evidence that he is an Indian. 
Such facts were peculiarly available to defendant. He, 
far more easily than the State, could produce evidence of his 
tribal relations. Indeed, the State otherwise would have to try 
to prove a negative (i.e., that defendant is not an Indian), and 
would have to meet that difficult burden in more or less an 
evidentiary vacuum, on nothing more than the defendant's bald 
allegation. Defendant had the burden of going forward with 
sufficient evidence to show prima facie that he is an Indian. 
"The party who asserts a fact has the burden to 
establish the fact." Yeazell v. Copins, 98 Ariz. 109, 402 P.2d 
541, 546 (1965). "The ordinary rule, based on considerations of 
fairness, does not place the burden upon a litigant to establish 
facts peculiarly within the knowledge of his adversary." United 
States v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 355 U.S. 253, 256 n.5 
(1957); Browzin v. Catholic University, 527 F.2d 843, 849 (D.C. 
Cir. 1975). In other words, "the party in the best position to 
present the requisite evidence should bear the burden of proof . 
. .," United States v. Continental Ins. Co., 776 F.2d 962, 964 
(11th Cir. 1985), and "[t]he party with the best knowledge 
normally sustains the burden." Lindahl v. Office of Personnel 
Management, 776 F.2d 276, 280 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
If defendant did not have the burden of production, the 
State would have the extreme burden of proving a negative, which 
burden the law does not favor. Trans-American Van Service v. 
U.S., 421 F.Supp. 308, 331 (N.D. Tex. 1976). And the State would 
have to prove that negative without the defendant's having to 
make any evidentiary showing whatever. "In that situation it 
would not make too much sense to thrust upon the [State] the 
burden of disproving the truth of the bare [allegation]." 
Lindahl, 776 F.2d at 780. 
United States v. Hester, 719 F.2d 1041 (9th Cir. 1983), 
illustrates the principle that a criminal defendant has the 
initial burden on whether or not he is an Indian. That case, 
like the instant one, involved 18 U.S.C. § 1152. Hester argued 
against federal jurisdiction because the statute's coverage does 
"not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against . . . 
another Indian" and the indictment had not alleged Hester's non-
Indian status, ^d. at 1042. 
The Government argued that it did not have the "burden 
of alleging and establishing the non-applicability of this 
exception to ,S 1152." .Id. The court agreed, citing, McKelvey v. 
United States, 260 U.S. 353, 357 (1922) ("it is incumbent on one 
who relies on such an exception to set it up and establish it"). 
As the court correctly noted, "It is far more manageable for the 
defendant to shoulder the burden of producing evidence that he is 
a member of a federally recognized tribe than it is for the 
Government to produce evidence that he is not. ..." Ld. at 719 
F.2d 1043. The Government does not have "the burden of going 
forward on that issue." Id. 
Similar analysis, although under a different (civil) 
statute, prevailed in Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 
F.2d 575 (1st Cir.), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 866 (1979). The 
court held against the tribe's position on burden of proof, in 
part because the tribe's opponent otherwise would "have to try to 
prove a negative." Ici. at 590. 
In this case, defendant is the party who would benefit 
from proof that he is an Indian, and he therefore has the burden 
of establishing that fact. In re Chicken Antitrust Litigation, 
560 F.Supp. 1006, 1008 (N.D. Ga. 1982). We acknowledge that the 
State ultimately has the burden of persuasion on jurisdiction 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(3), but that does not alter 
defendant's burden of producing evidence in the first instance to 
2 
establish prima facie that he is an Indian. If he meets the 
Section 76-1-501(3) states: "The existence of jurisdiction and 
venue are not elements of the offense but shall be established by 
a preponderance of the evidence." 
2 
That the State has the burden of persuasion on jurisdiction 
does not necessarily mean it has the burden of going forward on 
that issue. Frankel v. Wyllie & Thornhill, Inc. 537 F.Supp. 730, 
735 (N.D. Va. 1982). Section 76-1-501(3) leaves it to the court 
to delineate whose burden it is to go forward with evidence in a 
burden, "then the ultimate burden of proof remains, of course, 
upon the Government." Hester, 719 F.2d at 1043. 
The State did not have the burden of refuting 
defendant's "Indian-status" allegation until he had given it a 
full prima facie basis in fact. And the record shows defendant 
failed to present evidence on all facts necessary to make a prima 
facie showing. 
POINT III 
IN THE EVENT THIS COURT ACCEPTS DEFENDANT'S 
CLAIMS THAT THE OFFENSE OCCURRED IN INDIAN 
COUNTRY AND DEFENDANT IS AN INDIAN FOR 
FEDERAL JURISDICTIONAL PURPOSES, THE PROPER 
REMEDY IS TO REDUCE THE CHARGE TO A CLASS B 
MISDEMEANOR. 
Initially, the State reasserts it's position that the 
State's jurisdiction was proper in the instant case because an 
essential element of each illegally passed check occurred in 
Vernal, Utah, which is off of the reservation. Alternatively, 
the State maintains that no elements of the offense occurred in 
Indian Country and defendant has not established himself as an 
Indian for purposes of federal jurisdiction. However, if this 
court accepts defendant's claims, defendant's offense of issuing 
bad checks, to which he entered a guilty plea on November 23, 
o 
Cont. particular case, and that burden may shift with the 
circumstances. "[T]here is not and cannot be any one general 
solvent for [allocating] the burden of proof in all cases. It is 
merely a question of policy and fairness based on experience in 
the different situations." Mashpee Tribe, 592 F.2d at 589 n.13, 
quoting, 9 Wigmore on Evidence, § 2486, p. 274 (3d ed. 1940) 
(bracketed word in the court's opinion). In some cases, the 
State may have the burden of production as well as the burden of 
persuasion, but not here. Fairness and efficiency require that 
the Indian criminal defendant have the burden of production on 
his Indian status. 
1987, should be punished as a class B misdemeanor. Two checks, 
one for $20 and one for $50, were passed to Vernal Drug (R. 2). 
This establishment, as defendant admits, is not located on the 
reservation. (See Brief of App. at 5-6.) Therefore, according 
to Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-201 and 76-6-505, the State's assertion 
of jurisdiction over the offenses committed in Vernal, Utah is 
proper and defendant should be punished for the commission of a 
class B misdemeanor at the very least. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court 
to uphold the jurisdiction of the District Court and affirm 
defendant's conviction. 
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APPENDIX A 
Basin. And finally, given the state of the record, it cannot be 
eaid that Perank's status as an Indian under 18 U.S.C. Sections 
1152 end 1153 was not established below. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE OFFENSE WAS NOT COMMITTED WITHIN INDIAN COUNTRY 
AND THE STATE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION 
Perank claims his crime vas committed within Indian country 
as defined by 18 U.S.C. 1151, and that—coupled with the allega-
tion that he is an Indian—deprived the state district court of 
jurisdiction. The following section of this brief will demon-
strate that the crime did not take place within Indian country 
because the original Uintah reservation has been disestablished 
and today consists only of "trust lands,11 and Perankfs offense 
was committed outside those trust lands. We first examine the 
principles established by the United States Supreme Court for 
determining whether a reservation has been disestablished. This 
is followed by an examination of the legislation and facts and 
circumstances surrounding the opening of the Uintah reservation 
which show that it has been disestablished. 
A. General Principles Governing Disestablishment 
Pursuant to the Act of May 27, 1902 (32 Stat. 245, 263), 
as amended, a Presidential Proclamation issued on July 14, 1905 
(34 Stat. 3119), providing that all the unallotted and unreserved 
lands of the original Uintah reservation were restored to the 
public domain and opened for public settlement under the home* 
stead and townsite laws. It is settled law that some surplus 
land acts diminished reservations, see, e.g.. Rosebud Sioux Tribe 
interpretation and marked a new direction in the Supreme Court's 
view of turn-of-the-century legislation concerning Indian reser-
vations. Thus, the en banc majority concluded that "[u]nder the 
Solem standards neither the Uncompahgre Reservation nor the 
Uintah Reservation has been disestablished or diminished by any 
of the congressional enactments in question". Ute Indian Tribe, 
773 F.2d at 1090-91. 
The majorityfs reading of Solem is not correct. Solent did 
not establish new "standards" and it did not alter the principles 
announced in Seymour, Mattz, DeCoteau and Rosebud, which the 
Court in Solem described as having "established a fairly clean 
analytical structure for distinguishing those surplus land acts 
that diminished reservations from those acts that simply offered 
non-Indians the opportunity to purchase lands within established 
reservation boundaries." 465 U.S. at 470. Although the Court 
has added several relevant factors to the traditional indicia of 
legislative intent, including how Congress and the Department of 
the Interior have treated the area in later years and whether the 
area has "lost its Indian character" because it is "predominately 
populated by non-Indians" (Solem, 465 U.S. at 471 ft n.12), the 
Court has not departed from the governing principle "that con-
gressional intent will control" (Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 5B6, and 
Solem, 465 U.S. at 470-71). 
In determining whether an Indian reservation exists, one must 
therefore first examine the face of the relevant legislation. 
Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 587. In each of the disestablishment cases 
tribal members could harvest timber on certain portions of the 
opened lands, "only as long as the land remained part of the 
public domain.* Sec. 9, 35 Stat. 464. The Court acknowledged 
that even this oblique reference was evidence of disestablish-
ment; It found, however, that because the phrase was "isolated," 
it could not be dispositive. Solem, 465 U.S. at 475* 
In justifying its expansive interpretation of Solem, the en 
banc majority also relied upon a footnote in Solem stating that 
there was "considerable doubt as to what Congress meant in 
using.-." public domain terminology in the Solem legislation 
since the affected lands "could be conceived of as being in the 
•public domain9 inasmuch as they were available for settlement" 
(id,, 465 U.S. at 475, n.17). It is evident, however, that the 
Court did not intend this statement in Solem to overrule its 
prior decisions and to discount the significance of public domain 
language in every other instance. The Court had already indi-
cated that such language supported the disestablishment claim 
and, in any event, the Court would hardly have confined its com-
ments to one sentence in a footnote had it intended such a dras-
tic departure from the views, expressed by both the majority and 
dissenting Justices in prior cases, regarding the significance of 
such restoration language. 
The en banc majority's decision to the contrary also over-
looks the Solem Court9s later observation, in the context of 
subsequent jurisdictional history, that: 
Unentered lands were considered a part of the 
reservation. They were available for allotment to 
tribal members, they were leased for the benefit of 
Strip"—* 7,000-ecre tract located on the edge of the original 
Uintah reservation—was disestablished by the Act of Kay 24, 1888 
(25 Stat. 157). See, e.g., Ute Indian Tribe, 773 P.2d at 1098 
(Seymour, J., concurring). Compare with district court opinion, 
id,, 521 F.Supp. at 1099. See also panel opinion, id., 716 F.2d 
at 1318 (Doyle, J., dissenting). As Judge Seymour stated, "Con-
gress was completely clear when it terminated Uintah rights in 
the Cilsonite Strip. . . ." Id^, 773 F.2d at 1098. Yet the 
operative provisions concerning the Cilsonite Strip used the same 
language as the 1902 (Uintah) Surplus Land Act and expressly re-
stored the area "to the public domain" (Section 1, 25 Stat. 157). 
The en banc majority offered no reason why the restoration lan-
guage contained In the 1902 Uintah Act should be Interpreted dif-
ferently, and there is none.li/ 
3. The decision of the en banc majority is also at odds vith 
the decisions of other courts of appeals in disestablishment 
cases. The Eighth and Ninth Circuits, in a long line of deci-
sions, have consistently recognized that restoration to public 
domain language is an explicit expression of congressional intent 
to disestablish.ii/ Also, decisions of the Tenth Circuit prior 
18. The dissent, on the other hand, relied upon the under-
standing of the parties regarding the effect of the 1888 Act in 
Interpreting the 1902 Surplus Land Act, as amended. See Ute 
Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1112. 
19. See, e.g., Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 521 F.2d 87, 90 
(8th Cir. 1975). affd, 430 U.S. 584 (1977); United States ex 
rel. Feather v. Erickaon, 489 F.2d 99, 100 (8th Cir. 1973), rev'd 
on other grounds sub nom. DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 
U.S. 425 (1975); United States ex rel. Condon v. Erickson, 478 
F.2d 684, 687-88 (8th Cir. 1973); Beardslee v. United States, 387 
Supreme Court remarked that: 
The doctrine first announced in Wilcox and 
Jackson, 13 Pet. 498, that a tract lawfully ap-
propriated to any purpose becomes thereafter sev-
ered from the mass of public lands . . . has been 
reaffirmed and applied by this court in such a 
great number and variety of cases that it may now 
be regarded as one of the fundamental principles 
underlying the land system of this country. 
Hastings and Dakota Railroad Co., 132 U.S. at 360-61. Contrary 
to the en banc majority's view, because the reservation of a 
tract removed it from the public domain,22/ later restoration of 
the tract to the public domain firmly signified the end of reser-
vation status.il/ 
In sum, the en banc majority's interpretation not only is 
inconsistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court and the low-
er federal courts in Indian reservation boundary cases, but also 
21. (Contfd.) F. 39, 41-42 (9th Cir. 1904); United States v. 
Techenor, 12 F. 415, 421 (D. Ore. 1882); Kansas Pacific Ry. Co. 
v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co., 13 F. 106, 107 (D. Kan. 
1881); and United States v. Payne, 6 F. 883, 893-94 (W.D. Ark. 
1881). •Public domain" and "public lands" traditionally have 
been regarded as "equivalent" concepts. Barker v. Harvey, 181 
U.S. 481, 490 (1901). 
22. As the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior ex-
plained years later in regard to the original Uintah reservation, 
"[a]lthough the . . . reservation had been created out of the 
public domain, the land comprising it did not occupy the status 
of public domain land while included within the reservation. • • 
•" Solicitor Opinion M-36051, at 5 (December 7, 1950). 
23. See Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 316 U.S. 
317 (1942). The issue in that case was whether the Sioux Tribe 
was entitled to compensation for certain lands reserved for it by 
executive orders but later "'restored to the public domain9 • . 
." by the President. Id. at 325. In holding that no compensa-
tion was due, the Supreme Court expressly found that the two Ex-
ecutive Orders restoring the lands to the public domain (I Kap-
pler 884-85, 899) "terminated the reservation. . . ." Id. at 
330. 
opening the reservation. It clearly shows a congressional Intent 
to restore the surplus lands to the public domain and dises-
tablish the reservation. 
After disregarding clear language of disestablishment on the 
basis of its misreading of Solem, the en banc majority proceeded 
to ignore other factors that must be considered not only under 
Solem but also under the Supreme Courtfs prior decisions. Sum-
marizing these decisions, the Court in Solem stated that when the 
area involved *has long since lost its Indian character, ve have 
acknowledged that de facto, if not de jure, diminishment may have 
occurred. . . ." 465 U.S. at 471. Thus, ••who actually moved 
onto opened reservation lands is . . . relevant to deciding 
whether a surplus land Act diminished a reservation. . . ." Id. 
By focusing all its attention on Solem and treating it as 
setting forth new principles, the en banc majority blinded itself 
to the teachings of the Supreme Court's earlier decisions. In 
addition to the statutory language, "the •surrounding circum-
stances,9 and the •legislative history9 are to be examined11 in 
interpreting surplus land enactments. Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 587. 
Accord, e.g., Solem, 465 U.S. at 469-70. The record here demon-
strates that the en banc majority did not consider these factors 
in a manner consistent with the relevant precedents. Subsection 
3 below reviews these other relevant factors. They vividly dem-
onstrate that the decision below will not materially advance the 
interests of tribal sovereignty, and will severely hamper the 
functioning of State and local governments. 
period. See General Allotment Act of 1887 (24 Stat. 388); DeCo-
teau at 432-33; and Solem at 466-67. 
The Uintah reservation contained vast areas of land in excess 
of the lands needed to aatlafy the allotments to the Indians. 
Therefore, Congress enacted the Act of May 27, 1902 (32 Stat. 
245), which was the Indian Appropriations Act for that year, and 
Included a provlaion restoring any lands not allotted to the 
Indians to the public domain. The relevant portion of the Act 
states: 
That the Secretary of the Interior, with the 
consent thereto of the majority of the adult male 
Indians of the Uintah and the White River tribes of 
Ute Indians, be ascertained as soon as practicable 
by an Inspector, shall cause to be allotted to each 
head of a family eighty acres of agricultural land 
which can be irrigated and forty acres of such land 
to each other member of said tribes, said allot-
ments to be made prior to October first, nineteen 
hundred and three, on which date all the unallotted 
lands within said reservation shall be restored to 
the public domain: ~. I ~. (Emphasis added) • 
Thus, the original 1902 Act authorizing the opening of the reser-
vation contained "public domain" language which is language "pre-
cisely suited" to disestablishment. DeCoteau, supra, at 445-446. 
Again, in Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Knelp, 430 U.S. 584 (1977), the 
Supreme Court held that language restoring surplus reservation 
land to the public domain (even though the original act was amen-
ded to provide for a different method of opening) demonstrated 
"an unmistakable baseline purpose of disestablishment." Id. at 
592. See also Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962). 
An important observation is that, In 1902, Congress believed 
the consent of the Indians had to be obtained before their lands 
reservation. Tha Department of Interior viewed the administra-
tive task under the 1903 Act to be one of Baking allotments to 
the Indiana and restoration of the aurplua lands to tha public 
domain aa aet forth in the 1902 Act. In May of 1903, Inspector 
McLaughlin met vith the Utes in the Uinta Basin to explain to 
them that the reservation vas to be terminated without their con-
aent and that allotments vould be made. The following extract 
from the transcript of that meeting clearly shows McLaughlin's 
understanding that the reservation boundaries were to be extin-
guished (JX 162, pg. 42): 
Inspector McLaughlin: 
A number of your speakers have said that you do 
not want your land stolen from you. My friends, 
these hills, these streams, these valleys will all 
remain just as they are. There will be no change 
in the nature of the country but the improvements 
that will come when white people come in among you. 
My friends, Bed Cap said my talk was cloudy, and 
you do not understand it. You are the people who 
are in the dark in regard to the force of this act 
of congress, and I am trying to bring you into the 
light. You say that line Is very heavy and that 
the reservation is nailed down upon the border. 
That is very true as applying to the past many 
years and up to now, but congress has provided 
legislation which will pull up the nails which hold 
down that line and after next year there will be no 
outside boundary line to this reservation. (Em-
phasis added).±2/ 
d. The Act of March 3, 1905 
The time aet by the 1904 Act for opening the 
reservation (March 10, 1905) vaa running out. Early in 1905, the 
25. For a more detailed veraion of McLaughlin1a negotiations 
vith the Indiana, aee JX 162, pp. 42*45. A eubsequent report of 
McLaughlin, eummarizing hla meetings vith the Utes, can be found 
at LD 101, pp. 9-12* 
two, such portions of the lands vithin the Uintah 
Indian Reservation as he considers necessary, and 
he may also set apart and reserve any reservoir 
site or other lands necessary to conserve and pro* 
tect the water supply for the Indians or for 
general agricultural development, and may confirm 
such rights to water thereon as have already ac-
crued: Provided, That the proceeds from any timber 
on such addition as may with safety be sold prior 
to June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and twenty, 
shall be paid to said Indians in accordance with 
the provisions of the act opening the reservation. 
(Emphasis in original.) 
e. The Relationship Between the 1902 and 1905 Acts 
The mn banc majority thought the 1905 Act (33 
Stat. 1069), extending the time for opening, supplanted the 1902 
Act (32 Stat. 263), restoring the lands to the public domain. 
Compare Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1089 with id. at 1111-12 
(Seth, J., dissenting). That reasoning is flawed and is not sup-
ported by the Acts, the legislative history or surrounding 
circumstances. 
It is true that the 1905 Act does not specifically repeat the 
"public domain" language of the 1902 Act. Rather, the 1905 Act 
contained a provision that the unallotted lands were to be dis-
posed of under "the general provisions of the homestead and town-
site laws, . . . and shall be opened to settlement and entry by 
proclamation of the President." But the 1905 Act did not purport 
to change whether there should be a disestablishment. That had 
already been clearly stated in the 1902 Act. The 1905 Act merely 
addressed the manner and procedures for accomplishing dises-
tablishment. There is no conflict or inconsistency between the 
two. 
change the 1902 intent. . . * ) . See also, debates at 39 Cong. 
Rec. 1181-1185, 3522 (Jan. 21, 1905, LD 103). 
What Congress was actually concerned about in 1905 (other 
than a speedy conclusion of the allotment process) vas that land 
speculators might deprive bona-fide homesteaders of the land. 
See •Indian Appropriations Bill, 1906," Hearings, Subcomm. of the 
Senate Comm. of Indian Affairs, 39th Cong., 3d Sess. (1905, LD 
100 at 30). Nowhere in the cited subcommittee debates is there 
any statement that the purpose of the limitations on entry vas to 
keep the reservation intact. To the contrary, the pertinent dis-
cussion reveals that even with such limitations the land would 
still be restored to the public domain. Senator Teller, one of 
the advocates of the limitation on entry stated at the hearings: 
"I am not going to consent to any speculators getting public land 
if I can help it" (Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra, LD 100 at 
30) (emphasis added)• Further, there is nothing in the congres-
sional debates or reports to indicate that Congress ever intended 
or desired to preserve the original exterior boundary of the Uin-
tah reservation. 
The real purpose and intent of the 1905 Act vas not only to 
implement the restoration of the surplus lands to the public do* 
sain as provided in the 1902 Act, but also to allow entry and 
settlement of such lands only under the homestead and townsite 
lavs in order to prevent speculation. Limitations on entry such 
as those contained in the 1905 Act are not inconsistent vith the 
previously expressed intent of Congress to restore surplus lands 
to the public domain and disestablish the reservation. Again, 
underlying the 1902 Act. The 1905 Proclamation is similar to the 
one involved in Rosebud and constitutes an "unambiguous, contem-
poraneous, statement, by the Nation's Chief Executive of a per-
ceived disestablishment. . •» (J^, 430 U.S. at 602*03), and 
unmistakably reflects the intent of Congress. See id, at 603. 
On this subject the en banc majority opinion is again silent. 
3. Additional Considerations Support Disestablishment 
In addition to examining the legislation opening a 
reservation, the Supreme Court has stated that another component 
of its "fairly clean analytical structure91 is to examine the 
subsequent history of the area: 
On a more pragmatic level, ve have recognized 
that who actually moved onto opened reservation 
lands is also relevant to deciding whether a 
surplus land act diminished a reservation. Where 
non-Indian settlers flooded into the opened portion 
of a reservation and the area has long since lost 
its Indian character, ve have acknowledged that de 
facto, if not de jure, diminishment may have oc-
curred. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, supra, 
at 58B, n 3, and 604-605, 51 L Ed 2d 660, 97 S Ct 
1361; Decoteau v. District County Court, 429 US at 
428, 43 L Ed 2d 300, 95 S Ct 1082. In addition to 
the obvious practical advantages of acquiescing to 
de facto diminishment, ve look to the subsequent 
demographic history of opened lands as one addi-
tional clue as to what Congress expected would hap-
pen once land on a particular reservation was 
opened to non-Indian settlers. 
Solem, 465 U.S. St 471. 
The Court further noted that: 
When an area is predominately populated by non-
Indians with only a few surviving pockets of Indian 
allotments, finding that the land remains Indian 
Country seriously burdens the administration of 
State and local governments. 
Solem at 471, n.12. 
margin expressly recognire that, with respect to the original 
Uintah reservation, the unallotted and unreserved lands vere re-
stored to the public domain under the provisions of the 1902 Act. 
The record shows as veil that officials of the Interior Depart-
ment treated the original Uintah reservation as having been 
disestablished. Thus, with the opening of the reservation in 
1905, Department officials immediately began referring to the 
original area as the "former" reservation. For decades after the 
opening, Interior officials consistently administered only the 
trust lends (the tribal grazing reserve, the allotments, and the 
lands later restored to tribal ownership and reservation status) 
as the Tribe's existing reservation,21/
 a practice that continued 
until recently.29/ 
27. (Cont'd.) 11, 1952); Appeal of Charles B. Gonsales, at 1 
(January 23, 1953); and Secretarial Order, 36 Fed. Reg. 19920 
(1971) (LD 210). 
28. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 5010, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., at 
1-2 (1906) (Letters of Secretary of Interior and Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs); Presidential Proclamation dated September 1, 
1906, 34 Stat. 3228; Letter of the Acting Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs, dated September 26, 1907, at 1 (JX 336); Letter of the 
First Assistant Secretary of the Interior to the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs, dated November 8, 1907, at 1 (JX 338); H.R. Doc. 
No. 1279, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., at 2-3 (1909) (1908 Letters of 
Secretary and Commissioner of Indian Affairs); Letter of the 
Secretary of Interior, dated December 19, 1908, at 1, 2, 4 & 6 
(JX 341); and 39 I.D. 79 (1910) (Acting Secretary of Interior). 
See also 34 I.D. 549, 549-50 (1906) (Ass't. Attorney General). 
29. See, e.g., 773 F.2d at 1105 (Seth J., dissenting); S. 
Doc. No. 78, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1919) (Letter of the 
Secretary of the Interior); 1929 Annual Report of the Uintah & 
Ouray Agency, at 1 (JX 420); 1931 Agency Crazing Report, at 1, 3 
(JX 424); 1931 Annual Agency Report, at 4 (JX 425); 1932 Annual 
Agency Report, at 1 (JX 427); H.R. Rep. No. 370, 77th Cong., 1st 
Sess., at 3 (1941) (Report submitted by Secretary of Interior); 
Phoenix Area Office, Information Profiles of Indian Reservations 
in Arizona, Nevada t Utah, at 155 (1976) (JX 490). 
Judicial pronouncements also follow suit. In decisions ren-
dered prior to Ute Indian Tribe, the courts interpreted the 1905 
Act as merely amending, not superseding, the 1902 Act.11/ In-
deed, in 1946, the Tenth Circuit expressly held in Hanson v. 
United States—a decision unaccountably ignored by the en banc 
majority—that the unalloted and unreserved lands of the original 
Uintah reservation vere "restored to the public domain by the Act 
of May 27, 1902. . . ." Id. at 163. The Utah Supreme Court 
likewise recognized the restoration of the unallotted lands to 
the public domain under these Acts. Sovards, 108 P. at 1114. 
Finally, in a different context, the United States Supreme Court 
recognized that the Tribe's reservation vas considered to be only 
i 
those lands held in trust by the federal government. Affiliated 
Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 141 (1972). 
Moreover, by holding that the original Uintah reservation 
remains intact, the en banc majority has created vhat must be one 
of the fev—if not the only—Indian reservations engulfing a na-
tional forest. The district court and the panel of the court of 
appeals agreed that such an anomaly vas not intended and that the 
forest provisions of the Act of March 3, 1905, 33 Stat. 1048, 
1069*70, vhlch set aside more than 1 million acres "as an addi-
tion to the Uintah Forest reserve, subject to the lavs, rules and 
regulations governing forest reserves," thereby diminished the 
32. See Hanson v. United States, 153 F.2d at 162-63; Uintah 
and White^Rlver Bands of Ute Indians, 139 Ct.Cl. at 5-6 ft 21-22; 
United States v. Boss, 160 F. 132, 132-33 (D. Utah 1906); and 
Sovards v. Meagher, 108 P. 1112, 1114 (Utah 1910). 
amendments thereto, • • • allotments in severalty . . . . were 
made to the Uintah and White River Indians, and surplus lands • . 
• • yere restored to the public domain, and opened for disposi-
tion under the public land lavs for the benefit of the Indians" 
(emphasis added). What Is more, the United States (and the Utes) 
consistently and repeatedly maintained that the original Uintah 
reservation was a former reservation; and throughout its opinion 
and findings, the Court of Claims also treated the original Uin-
tah reservation as having ended. E.g., 139 Ct.Cl. at 2, 25, 28, 
56, 64, 69 and 70. It is also worthy of note that when the Ute 
Indian plaintiffs appeared in the Court of Claims, they summed it 
up veil: "Nov, the Act of May 27, 1902, comes as a matter of 
particular importance in this suit because that is the Act as 
amended under which the Uintah Reservation vas ultimately broken 
up."22/ 
b. Subsequent Demographic History Supports 
Disestablishment 
Here, the demographic history of the area demon-
strates that the en banc majority's decision will not materially 
advance the interests of tribal sovereignty (which has for the 
past 60 years been exercised primarily on the trust lands), but 
will seriously hamper the functioning of State and local govern-
ments in a myriad of areas. The disputed area "lost its Indian 
character" long ago. It is "predominantly populated by non-
33. Opening statement in testimony for plaintiff, Uintah and 
White River Band of Utes v, U.S., No. 47569, U.S. Court of Claims 
at p. 195 (Jan. 11, 1954). 
reservation area subsequent to the opening, except on the trust 
lands. The early jurisdictional history of the disputed area 
shows that the Indians of the Uintah and Ouray Agency (the White 
River, Uintah and Uncompahgre Utes) were, after the historic 
reservation was opened to settlement, generally subject to the 
laws of the State of Utah within those areas so opened (excluding 
trust lands).21/ For example, in the Annual Report of the Super-
intendent of the Uintah and Ouray Agency for 1916 (JX 380), it 
was stated as follows: 
The Indians of this Jurisdiction are citizens of 
the State of Utah, and voters, and the present 
Superintendent has not assumed any jurisdiction 
over their persons. Where offences have been corn-
Bitted against the laws of the State, the matter 
has been reported to the County authorities and the 
agency officials have endeavored to co-operate with 
the County authorities in the maintenance of law 
and order. 
Id. at 2*3. Other documentary evidence also demonstrates that 
the State exercised jurisdiction within the historic reservation 
area beginning in the early 1900'*.11/ 
The primary evidence regarding the more recent jurisdictional 
history of the disputed area was the testimony of various State 
and local officials introduced at the federal district court tri-
al. This testimony shows that until recently the State continued 
95. See, e.g., JX 344; JX 354 at 2-3; JX 368 at 2-3; JX 380 
at 2; JX 386 at 4-5; JX 393 at 3-4; JX 396; JX 397 at 2; JX 399 
at 2; JX 412 at 1; JX 415 at 1-3; JX 417 at 1-2; and JX 420. 
36. See also letter from District Superintendent, Indian 
Field Service, August 5, 1926 (JX 412); Annual Report of the 
Superintendent of the Uintah and Ouray Agency, 1917 and 1918; JX 
386 at 4-5; JX 393 at 3-4. See also Trial Tr. at 269 and 277-78 
(testimony of Ceorge Karett, Sheriff of Duchesne County). 
Further, for many decades the Ute Tribe has maintained signs 
at the boundaries of the trust lands, advising the public that 
they were entering the "Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation." 
These signs were clearly intended to designate what the Tribe 
thought were the reservation boundaries. The signs have been 
replaced from time to tine over the years (with the signs in more 
recent times being more elaborate), but they have always indi-
cated that the boundaries of the trust lands were the reservation 
boundaries.12/ 
In short, the record is clear that until recent years the 
Tribe never attempted to exert any significant jurisdictional 
authority off the trust lands. The history of the area in dis-
pute shows that it has long been the responsibility of State and 
local governments, is overwhelmingly populated by non-Indians, 
and has lost its Indian character virtually from the opening of 
the reservation in 1905. 
Applying the analytical test developed by the United States 
Supreme Court to the legislation, facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the opening of the original Uintah reservation, the con-
clusion Bust be that the reservation was disestablished and the 
surplus lands which were restored to the public domain are not 
part of the reservation--nor do they constitute Indian country as 
40. See, for example, the testimonies of Dave Thomas (Tr. 
155-57} and Cordon Karmston (Tr. 176-77). A series of photo-
graphs of such signs located at trust land boundaries, as such 
signs appeared on March 22, 1977, were introduced at trial as Ex. 
I-4B, coordinated with Ex. I-4A, indicating the precise locations 
where the various photographs were taken. 
